In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.
Introduction
In this paper we address the question which players in a monotonic simple game with veto control "should" form a winning coalition. Inspired by the work of Shenoy (1979) , we fix a semi-value (i.e., a symmetric probabilistic value (cf. Weber (1988) , Monderer and Samet (2002) ) for the simple game and use it to extract players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic coalition formation game (cf. Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) and Banerjee et al. (2001) ). A solution of this (and each) hedonic game is a partition of the set of players into coalitions. In this way, we have a suitable environment in which the question of stability can be approached. As it can be easily seen, it is not possible a coalition structure to be stable (to be defined later) if it does not contain a winning coalition. Hence, the answer to the question which partitions are stable is at the same time an answer to the question which winning coalitions should form with respect to stability concerns.
We have chosen the strict core as our stability concept for hedonic games, being the strongest stability notion based on coalitional deviations. As it turns out, if the winning coalition in a coalition structure contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, then the coalition structure belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game.
In order to fully characterize the strict core, we consider symmetric simple games with veto control and show that the winning coalition in each strictly core stable partition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions. Further, provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, the partition containing the grand coalition turns out to be the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.
The way of modelling we follow in this paper is a stylized one since, by using a semi-value to induce preferences over coalitions, we assume players to be purely office seeking. This line of study has a long tradition since Riker's (1962) classical monograph (see Laver and Schofield (1990) for an extensive survey). Peleg (1981) and Einy (1985) develop a theory of coalition formation in simple games with dominant players, whereas Carreras (1996) studies, among others, the formation of partnerships 2 (cf. Kalai and Samet (1987) ) in simple games. In contrast to these papers, we do not presuppose any (additional) internal structure on the winning coalition that forms; its internal structure is rather determined by the notion of strict core stability applied to the induced hedonic game. More precisely, we bring together a power index (applied to a monotonic simple game with veto control) with the notion of (strict) core stability, arriving at the "most stable" winning coalition containing the union of all minimal winning coalitions. The methodology can of course be applied to a broader class of problems, which leads us to a property of the simple game that appears to be crucial. Shenoy (1979, Theorem 7 .4) provides a sufficient condition for nonemptiness of the core of an abstract game appropriately induced by the Shapley value (which is the unique efficient semi-value) of a proper monotonic simple game. The condition says that the simple game should not exhibit the paradox of smaller coalitions (to be defined later) with respect to the Shapley value. However, as we show in Section 3, a monotonic simple game with veto control (being proper) satisfies Shenoy's condition with respect to the corresponding semi-value if and only if the veto player set is a winning coalition. Thus, the classes of simple games considered by Shenoy (1979) and in the present paper are rather complementary.
Surprisingly, up to our knowledge, situations of coalition formation involving veto players have never been considered in the literature. One particular reason is that in a simple game every coalition of parties which can constitute the necessary majority to form a government is deemed as a winning coalition. However, this way of modeling neglects many aspects a political party may consider as important when forming its preferences over the possible governments it may be a member of -for instance, the political views of the other members. And if these considerations are taken into account while incorporating a government formation situation into the framework of simple games, the resulting simple game will have a high probability to be veto- 
Preliminaries

Simple games
Let N be a finite set of players, which we will keep fixed throughout the paper. A transferable utility game (TU-game) with player set N is a function v : 2 N → R with v(∅) = 0. Each subset of N is a called a coalition. We denote the set of TU-games A solution (of a TU-game) is a mapping ϕ: 
A probabilistic value also assigns to each player an average of his marginal contributions and hence, it keeps an essential feature of the Shapley value. However, it might fail to satisfy either efficiency or symmetry. To be more precise, let P i N denote the set of probability distributions on 2 N \{i} , the family of coalitions not containing
where p i ∈ P i N can be interpreted as player i's subjective evaluation of the probability of joining different coalitions. For instance, the probabilistic value which is defined 
Hedonic games
For each player i ∈ N we denote by N i = {X ⊆ N | i ∈ X} the collection of all coalitions containing i. A partition Π of N is called a coalition structure. For each coalition structure Π and each player i ∈ N , we denote by Π(i) the coalition in Π containing player i, i.e., Π(i) ∈ Π and i ∈ Π(i). The set of all coalition structures of N will be denoted by C N .
Further, we assume that each player i ∈ N is endowed with a preference i over N i , i.e., a binary relation over N i which is reflexive, complete, and transitive. Denote Unlike solution concepts for (simple) cooperative games do, there is no worth to distribute in hedonic games. The relevant question is rather, which coalition structure should form, taking players' preferences into account. The basic property that we require is strict core stability.
Given a hedonic game (N, ), a partition Π of N is strictly core stable for (N, ), if there does not exist a nonempty coalition X such that X i Π(i) holds for all i ∈ X and X j Π(j) is true for some player j ∈ X. Π is core stable if there does not exist a nonempty coalition X such that X i Π(i) holds for each i ∈ X. Put in other words, a coalition structure Π is strictly core stable if no group of players are willing to form a coalition, so that each player is at least as well off with this new coalition and some player is better off compared to the corresponding coalitions in Π. Clearly, a weaker notion of coalitional deviation is incorporated in the definition of core stability 6 -everyone in the deviating coalition should be better off. Observe that strict core stability implies core stability. In what follows, we denote by SC (N, ) the set of all strictly core stable coalition structures of a hedonic game (N, ). Alternatively, we call SC (N, ) the strict core of (N, ).
Coalition formation
Given a game v ∈ S N and a semi-value F ∈ F, we define a hedonic game (N, ) by inducing players' preferences over coalitions in the following way (cf. Shenoy (1979), Dimitrov and Haake (2005)). For each i ∈ N and for all S, T ∈ N i ,
According to (1), player i's preferences over any two coalitions S and T he may be a member of are induced by i's semi-value in the simple game restricted to S and T , respectively. Notice that paying attention to the corresponding coalitions is compatible with the very definition of a hedonic game -each player in such a game evaluates any two coalition structures based only on his preferences over the coalitions in the two partitions he belongs to (cf. Aumann and Dréze (1974), Shenoy (1979) ).
Strict core existence
We now turn to the question whether there exist strictly core stable coalition structures for hedonic games induced as in (1). For v ∈ S N , let
In other words, the set CP 
with
Moreover, the correspondence P → F P is one-to-one.
Taking into account the above characterization, the following two lemmas will be helpful.
Proof. 
and
We establish the inequality
where the sets A, B, and C are defined as follows:
Let R ∈ B∪C. If R ∈ B, then R is obviously a member of A. Suppose now that R ∈ C.
Then, there exists R ∈ B such that R = R ∪ {j}. Moreover, R is a losing coalition since i ∈ R is a veto player. We have also R ∪ {i} ∈ W v by R ∪ {i} ∈ W v and the monotonicity of v. Hence, R ∈ A which implies A ⊇ B ∪C. Furthermore, it can easily be observed that the inclusion is strict, i.e., A ⊃ B ∪ C,
where the third equality follows from (3) and hence, the assertion follows. Notice that the inequality is strict when M W
Lemma 2 Let v ∈ S
N , F ∈ F and S = ∪ S ∈MW v S . Then, for each T ⊆ N ,
Proof. Let T ⊆ N . If T is a losing coalition, by the monotonicity of v, we are done.
Since each i ∈ N \ S is a null player in v (and hence, in each of its corresponding subgames), it is obvious that
So, assume that T ∈ W v and T S, and let j ∈ N \ T . In view of the proof of Lemma 1,
and
Consider a sequence of players j 1 , . . . , j such that {j 1 , . . . , j } = S \ T ; thus, T ∪ {j 1 , . . . , j } ⊃ S. 
for each i ∈ veto(v).
We are ready now to present our strict core existence result.
Proposition 1 Let v ∈ S
N , F ∈ F and (N, ) be induced as in (1) .
Proof. Let Π be a partition of N containing S = ∪ S ∈MW v S . Since CP Suppose now that MW v = {veto(v)} and to the contrary, let there be a (winning) coalition T ⊆ N such that
Consider the following two possible cases:
for each i ∈ S and each T ⊇ S. Hence,
for each i ∈ S∩T , i.e., (6) should hold for some j ∈ T \S.
Notice however that, by the monotonicity of v, (6) implies F j (v T ) > 0 which is, since j ∈ N \ S is a null player in v (and thus, in v T ), a contradiction to F j (v T ) = 0.
Case 2 : S T . In view of the proof of Lemma 2, we have
for each i ∈ veto(v) ⊆ T , a contradiction to (5).
We would like finally to mention that, given a simple game with veto control, inducing a hedonic game by a semi-value (as in (1)) is crucial for the nonemptiness of the strict core. Our first example illustrates this point.
Example 1 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and the game v ∈ S N be given by its minimal winning coalitions MW v = {12, 13}. Let ϕ be a solution such that
if S ∈ {12, 13, 123} , 0 otherwise.
if S = 12, 3 8 if S = 123, 0 otherwise.
if S = 13, is not a semi-value. If the opposite were the case, then, by (2),
, β |N | (1) must be equal to 3 8 . But then
contradicting with
is not a semi-value.
Taking the payoffs according to ϕ to extract preferences over coalitions, the players evaluate coalitions as follows:
12 2 123 2 2 ∼ 2 23.
Collecting all preferences, we obtain a hedonic game (N, ) with preferences induced by ϕ. Inspecting (N, ), one finds that SC (N, ) = ∅.
Symmetric games
Notice that the inverse inclusion to the one in Proposition 1 can be proved only in very special cases. For instance, it is easy to show that if either
. However, in general and as exemplified next, the strict core might be strictly larger than CP 
if S = N, 1 2 if S ∈ {12, 123, 124} , 1 3 if S = 134, 0 otherwise.
if S ∈ {12, 123, 124} , 3 12 if S = N, 0 otherwise.
if S = 134, 1 12 if S = N, 0 otherwise.
if S = 134, 1 12 if S = N, 0 otherwise, Taking this to extract preferences over coalitions, the players evaluate coalitions as Collecting all preferences, we obtain a hedonic game (N, ). Inspecting (N, ), one
In order to provide a full characterization of the strict core of the induced hedonic game, we will require the underlying simple game to be symmetric. Recall that v ∈ S N is symmetric, if S ∈ W v implies T ∈ W v for each coalition T with veto (v) ⊆ T and
Proposition 2 Let v ∈ S N be symmetric, F ∈ F and (N, ) be induced as in (1) .
Proof. In view of Proposition 1 it is enough to show that if a partition Π contains a winning coalition T / ∈ P v , then Π / ∈ SC (N, ).
Notice first that by T / ∈ P v , we have T = N . Let j ∈ N \ T and i ∈ T \ veto(v)
(such an i exists since, otherwise, T ∈ W v and T \ veto(v) = ∅ would imply T ∈ P v ).
Consider the coalition T = (T \ {i}) ∪ {j}. By the symmetry of v, all non-veto players in T are symmetric in v T and all non-veto players in T are symmetric in
for each i ∈ T \ {j}, and
. It follows then that T is a deviation (in the sense of the strict core) from Π and thus, Π / ∈ SC (N, ).
The case in which the monotonic simple game v is proper and symmetric was also analyzed by Shenoy (1979) 1 . In his Theorem 7.6, he shows that the core of the hedonic game (induced as in (1) Finally, we show that the partition containing the grand coalition is the "most"
Corollary 1 Let v ∈ S N be symmetric, F ∈ F and (N, ) be induced as in (1) . If
Proof. It follows from veto(v) / ∈ W v that there is a player i ∈ N \ veto(v) who belongs to a minimal winning coalition. Hence, by the symmetry of v, each player from N \ veto(v) is member of a minimal winning coalition; thus, ∪ S ∈MW v S = N .
In view of the proof of Proposition 1, SC (N, ) = {{N }}.
Veto games and the paradox of smaller coalitions
As already mentioned, the strict core of a hedonic game is the strongest stability notion based on coalitional deviations. Another possibility, pursued by Shenoy (1979) , is to consider the weaker notion of the core. In his Theorem 7.4, Shenoy (1979) shows that if players' preferences over coalitions are induced as in (1) Let S 1 , S 2 ∈ MW v , S 1 = S 2 and Π be a partition containing S = ∪ S ∈MW v S .
Since S 1 ⊂ S and v does not exhibit the paradox w.r.t. F ,
Since S 2 ∈ MW v with S 2 = S 1 , it follows from Lemma 2 that F i (v S ) > F i (v S 1 ) in contradiction to (7).
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we focussed on the stability of coalition structures containing the union of all minimal winning coalitions (or one of its supersets) in simple games with veto
control. An important question about any stable coalition structure is whether there 
